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SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL: THE HISTORY
AND CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF ONE OF THE
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION'S
PRINCIPAL ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
Maxwell Multer*
ABSTRACT
The cornerstone of the graduated enforcement scheme enacted to
in America's mines, significant and substantial has long been one
safety
ensure
of the Mine Safety and Health Administration's principal enforcement tools. In
the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Congress mandated that
when a federal mine inspector issues a citation for a violation of a mandatory
health or safety standard, the inspector must indicate whether the violation is
one that "could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect
of a mine safety or health hazard." While Congress provided minimal guidance
as to what it intended and what types of violations it was referring to with the
quoted language, "significant and substantial" was ultimately implemented as a
substantive designation used to denote conditions and practices that were more
serious in nature than a mere violation. Repeated issuance of significant and
substantial violations can lead to increasingly severe sanctions and penalties for
a mine operator. The analytical framework used to determine whether a given
violation is significant and substantial, although being refined a number of
times, has remained largely constant over the last forty years. However, the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("Commission") recently
issued a series of decisions which purport to apply the traditional framework
but at the same time appear to have broadened the scope of what violations
might be considered significant and substantial. This Article serves the dual
purpose of(1) filling a longstanding void in legal scholarship on this subject by
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their various regulating agencies, including the Mine Safety and Health Administration. Mr.
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Commission. He earned his B.S. in Economics from North Carolina State University, with high
honors, and his J.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, with honors. He is a
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providing a comprehensive discussion of the origins and evolution of the
concept of significant and substantial and (2) discussing and analyzing several
recent Commission decisions that raise questions regarding the appropriate
analysis used to determine what violations are significant and substantial.
I.
II.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The phrase "significant and substantial" first appeared in the 1969
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act ("Coal Act" or "1969 Coal Act").'
Congress mandated that when a federal mine inspector issues a citation for a
violation of a mandatory health or safety standard, the inspector must indicate
whether the violation is one that "could significantly and substantially

I
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-964 (1977)).
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contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard."2 This
mandate was carried over when Congress later amended the Coal Act through
the passage of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("Mine Act" or
"1977 Mine Act").3 However, in choosing that statutory language, Congress
conspicuously omitted any binding definition or even meaningful guidance as
to what "significantly and substantially" actually meant. Without such
guidance, it was left to the courts to construe the language and to determine to
what type of violations Congress intended it to apply. In turn, the idea of
significant and substantial would be interpreted by the courts to refer to a
particular class of violations which were in some way more serious than a
simple violation of the letter of the regulation. As a designation of such
violations, significant and substantial has evolved to become one of the
cornerstones of the graduated enforcement scheme implemented by the Mine
Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") to police America's mines. With
repeated issuances, these more serious violations give rise to progressively
more sanctions and penalties.*4
Each day, an army of federal mine inspectors around the country travel
into the mines to examine various areas and equipment for compliance with the
mandatory safety and health standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor
("Secretary"). When an inspector identifies conditions which he or she believes
to be a violation of one of the Secretary's mandatory safety or health standards,
he issues a citation in which he is required to make a series of substantive
designations to communicate both the seriousness of the violation and the level
of negligence attributable to the mine operator ("operator").5 One of the
designations to be made by the inspector is whether a given violation is
significant and substantial.
While the inspector issuing a citation makes an initial judgment on
whether the violation is significant and substantial, his decision is subject to
review by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ's decision is also
subject to review by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
("FMSHRC" or "Commission"), then to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and finally to the Supreme Court of the United States.6 The analysis
applied in the courts to determine whether a violation qualifies as significant
and substantial has been largely the same for the last forty years. The enduring
construction of significant and substantial was established by the FMSHRC in

2

Id.

Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at
30 U.S.C. §§ 801-964).
4
See, e.g., Pattern of Violations, 30 C.F.R. § 104(e) (2012).
See DEP'T OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., CITATION AND ORDER WRITING
HANDBOOK FOR COAL MINES AND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES 75-78 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.msha.gov/READROOM/HANDBOOK/PHO8-I-I.pdf.
6
See 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1) (2006).
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Cement Division, National Gypsum Co. ("National Gypsum"). 7 Three years
later, in the Commission's 1984 Mathies Coal Co. ("Mathies") decision, it
distilled that construction to four required elements necessary for a given
violation to qualify as significant and substantial. This test came to be known
as the Mathies significant and substantial test and, although it may have
undergone some adjustments, continues to be the legal framework applied
today.
Once the Commission established that framework in the early 1980s,
the analysis, although refined several times over the following ten years or so,
remained, for the most part, constant over the following forty years. However,
when the Commission issued its 2010 opinion in Musser Engineering,Inc. &
PBS Coals, Inc.,9 its analysis of the significant and substantial issue, which it
discussed very briefly, seemed to be not only a significant departure from prior
jurisprudence but also wholly inconsistent with a great deal of long relied-upon
and firmly established precedent. What started as an apparent anomaly in PBS
Coals was revisited in the Commission's subsequent decision in Cumberland
Coal Resources, LP ("Cumberland"), in which there was significantly more
discussion and analysis.'o Although the Commission majority maintained in
Cumberland that they were not changing the Mathies test, the language and
analysis appeared to constitute a marked departure, and one that would greatly
expand the scope of what violations would be considered significant and
substantial. Curiously, the Commission reached its holding in Cumberland by
interpreting its own holdings from National Gypsum and Mathies in a way that
is fundamentally and demonstrably inconsistent with the vast majority of
precedent between 1984 and 2010, as discussed below.
This Article is intended to serve two purposes. First, it is intended to
fill a void in legal scholarship on this subject by making available to
practitioners a comprehensive discussion of the origins, evolution, and current
state of the significant and substantial analysis in mine safety litigation. This
will be accomplished through a discussion of the important decisions that
shaped it over the years. The second purpose is to discuss several recent
Commission decisions that are worded and applied in a way that could
potentially increase the scope of what violations would be considered
significant and substantial. That portion of this Article argues that such an
analytical shift is, if not completely inappropriate, severely excessive in scope.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the relevant provisions
containing the significant and substantial language in the 1969 Coal Act and the
1977 Mine Act. Part III analyzes the circumstances involved and the

8

10

Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822 (1981).
Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1 (1984).
Musser Eng'g, Inc. & PBS Coals, Inc., 32 FMSHRC 1257 (2010).
Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC 2357 (2011).
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Commission's decisions in PBS Coals and Cumberland.Part IV discusses the
cases heard by the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals ("IBMA"), the
predecessor to the Commission that shaped the IBMA's construction and
application of the Coal Act's significant and substantial language. Part V will
include a similar discussion of the Commission case law, including National
Gypsum and Mathies, that shaped the definition and legal analysis for the
identical significant and substantial language contained in the 1977 Mine Act.
The final Part concludes with the argument that the language used by the
Commission in PBS Coals and Cumberland is problematic, not supported by
Commission precedent, and should, if it is to remain in effect at all in the
future, be limited to alleged violations of "evacuation standards."
II. SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL-THE RELEVANT STATUTORY LANGUAGE
OF THE 1969 COAL ACT AND THE 1977 MINE ACT

The significant and substantial language at issue first appeared in the
1969 Coal Act." While the statute and legislative history made clear
Congress's intention that certain more serious violations be designated as such
by an inspector issuing a citation, it provided minimal guidance as to the
precise scope of what violations should be included, much less any kind of
analytical framework to apply to different factual scenarios in order to
determine if a given situation qualifies as one of those more serious violations.
Indeed, the near totality of Congress's guidance came from the language which
became the statutory language itself.
Section 104(c)(1) of the 1969 Coal Act reads as follows:
If, upon any inspection of a coal mine, an authorized
representative of the Secretary finds that there has been a
violation of any mandatory health or safety standard, and if he
also finds that, while the conditions created by such violation
do not cause imminent danger, such violation is of such nature
as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause
and effect of a mine safety or health hazard, and if he finds
such violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such
operator to comply with such mandatory health or safety
standards, he shall include such finding in any notice given to
the operator under this Act.12
With the enactment of the Coal Act, containing the above language, it was left
to the Secretary of the Interior and the courts to determine both the bounds of

11 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-964 (1977)).
12
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 104(c)(1), 83
Stat. 742, 751.
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the authority bestowed by Congress, and what type of enforcement tools were
intended. As may be clear from a review of the above quoted language from
section 104(c)(1), the statutory language was somewhat less than a model of
clarity. As a result, it would take a number of years to establish an enduring
interpretation, and the scope of the significant and substantial clause would
broaden and narrow a number of times over that period.' 3 That process of
interpretation would continue after the passage of the 1977 Mine Act and the
replacement of the IBMA with the Commission. The Mine Act, in section
104(d)(1), contained language identical to the significant and substantial
language from the Coal Act, quoted above. 14 The Mine Act's legislative history
was similarly lacking in guidance as to what Congress intended by it.' 5
This being the case, it was left to the courts to preside over the dispute
between the enforcement agency and the mining industry as to what Congress
meant by "significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a
mine safety or health hazard." However, before discussing the evolution of the
significant and substantial language in depth, we will consider three recent
decisions that have dealt with how significant and substantial is to be applied,
and the rationale applied by the Commission in reaching its conclusions.
III. PBS COALS AND CUMBERLAND COAL RESOURCES"NOT CHANGING MATHIES"

While the Commission purports to be applying the longstanding
Mathies significant and substantial test, the application of its recent
"clarification" of the analysis suggests otherwise. Indeed, its three most recent
discussions of significant and substantial seem to be inconsistent with the cases
that were the most important in defining the analysis, including Mathies itself.
Notably, in Cumberland,the Commission elected to affirmatively argue that it
was not changing the analysis that had long been applied under Mathies, which
established the four requirements that must be present for a violation to be
significant and substantial over forty years ago.' 6 The first of these recent cases,
Musser Engineering,Inc. & PBS Coals, Inc. ("PBS Coals"),7 arose as a result
of the mine inundation that occurred in 2002 at PBS's Quecreek No. 1 Mine.
However, the events that constituted the violation in PBS Coals occurred long

See discussion infra Part IV.
14
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, § 104(d), 91 Stat.
1290, 1300 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)).
15
See S. Rep. No. 95-181 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401; H.R. Rep. No. 91563 (1969), reprintedin 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503.
16
Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2368.
17
32 FMSHRC 1257 (2010).
13

18

Id. at 1257-58.
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before the breakthrough into the nearby abandoned mine which resulted in the
inundation.
A.

Musser Engineering, Inc. & PBS Coals, Inc.

There were several abandoned mines in the vicinity of the Quecreek
No. 1 Mine. 19 One of these abandoned mines was the Harrison No. 2 Mine.20 In
the 1990s, another company had begun the permitting process to open the
Quecreek Mine, prior to the mine being purchased by PBS Coals, Inc. ("PBS").
Then PBS acquired the mine prior to the completion of the permitting process,
and contracted with Musser Engineering, Inc. ("Musser"), to prepare the
necessary permit application. 21 Both PBS and Musser made diligent efforts
over a multi-year period to locate final maps of the nearby abandoned Harrison
No. 2 mine to use during the process.2 2 While they were able to procure maps
from multiple sources, including the Pennsylvania Department of
23
depicting
Environmental Protection and Consolidated Coal Company,
different stages of development, they were unable to locate any maps
purporting to be final.24 As a result, Musser and PBS simply adopted the map
which had the most development depicted as representing the final map. 25
However, despite never locating a map marked as "final," and thus having
reason to suspect that the map used may not have been completely accurate,
neither PBS nor Musser made any notations or disclaimers of any sort on any
Quecreek No. 1 maps which would reveal that the location of the Harrison No.
2 Mine was uncertain.26 In July 2002, the miners at Quecreek No. 1 broke into
the old works of the Harrison No. 2 mine, which the official Quecreek No. 1
map reflected as being an additional 450 feet away at the time.27 It was through
a combination of luck and the .perseverance of mine rescuers that all nine
miners who had been trapped were able to come out alive.28
MSHA conducted an investigation into the events that occurred at
Quecreek No. I and determined that the mine inundation was a result of using

19

Id. at 1259.

20

Id
Id

21

Id. The Double C Coal Company had "initiated the application process with the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection" in 1994 but sold the mine to PBS before
it was completed. Id.
23
Id. Consol owned the mineral rights to the Harrison No. 2 Mine and, as it was ultimately
discovered, was in possession of a final map as well. Id. at 1260.
24
Id. at 1260.
25
See id at 1260-61.
26
Id. at 1264.
27
Id. at 1258, 1263.
28
See id at 1259.
22
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the inaccurate map, which allowed the Quecreek miners to accidently mine into
the adjacent and flooded Harrison No. 2 Mine.2 9 Accordingly, MSHA issued
citations to PBS, Musser, and Black Wolf Coal Company3 0 under 30 C.F.R. §
75.1200, which requires the maintenance of an up-to-date map and mandates
the inclusion on that map of, among other things, "adjacent mine workings
within 1,000 feet."3 The citation was for the ongoing failure to maintain a map
which accurately reflected the adjacent Harrison No. 2 Mine.32 The citations for
each entity were designated significant and substantial. In its decision, the
Commission determined that while Musser was subject to its jurisdiction under
the Mine Act, Musser's activities in preparing the map used in the permit
application some years earlier were too attenuated to sustain the violation of
section 75.1200.34 It held that PBS, on the other hand, had clearly failed to
fulfill the requirements of section 75.1200 by using a map which proved to be
inaccurate, and thus had violated the regulation.3 PBS argued, among other
things, that the violation was not significant and substantial.3 6
In considering whether the violation was significant and substantial, the
Commission began by briefly discussing its construction of the significant and
substantial analysis established in Cement Division, National Gypsum Co. 3 7 and
Mathies Coal Co. 3 8 It cited NationalGypsum for the proposition that a violation
is significant and substantial "if, based on the particular facts surrounding the
violation, there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will
result in an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature."39 It continued by
reciting, with approval, the Mathies significant and substantial test, that
the Secretary of Labor must prove: (1) the underlying violation
of a mandatory safety standard; (2) a discrete safety hazard-

29
30

3

Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1262-63.
30 C.F.R. § 75.1200 (2012). This regulation provides:
"The operator of a coal mine shall have in a fireproof repository located in an
area on the surface of the mine chosen by the mine operator to minimize the
danger of destruction by fire or other hazard, an accurate and up-to-date map
of such mine drawn on scale. Such map shall show: (a) The active workings.
. . (h) Adjacent mine workings within 1,000 feet ....

Id.
32

See Musser Eng'g,Inc. & PBS Coals, 32 FMSHRC at 1263.

33

Id.

34

Id at 1269-70, 1276.
Id at 1274-75.
Id at 1265.
Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822, 825 (1981).
Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1, 2-3 (1984).

3
36
3
38

Musser Eng'g, Inc. & PBS Coals, 32 FMSHRC at 1279-80.
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that is, a measure of danger to safety-contributed to by the
violation; (3) a reasonable likelihood that the hazard
contributed to will result in an injury; and (4) a reasonable
likelihood that the injury in question will be of a reasonably
serious nature.40
In the initial decision in PBS Coals, the ALJ had considered and upheld
MSHA's significant and substantial designation based on his application of the
Mathies test to the circumstances at issue. The Commission agreed with the
judge's findings with regard to the first two Mathies requirements, that the
regulation had been violated when an inaccurate mine map was produced, and
that the violation contributed to the discrete safety hazard that ultimately
resulted in an accident, the danger of a breakthrough to an adjacent mine.41
PBS's principal arguments related to the third Mathies requirement:
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to would
result in an injury. PBS argued that substantial evidence did not support the
judge's decision because the Secretary failed to produce "an analysis . . . of
situations where mining was conducted without a final map ... and the number
of times that resulted in a breakthrough and the number of times that resulted in
injuries.'A 2 It was in dispensing with PBS's arguments regarding the third
Mathies requirement that the Commission used the language that seems to have
brought the longstanding analysis into question.
The Commission began its discussion on this issue by stating that PBS
had confused the words "violation" and "hazard" in the Mathies test.4 3 it
elaborated:
The test under the third element is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to by the
violation, i.e., the danger of breakthrough and resulting
inundation, will cause injury. The Secretary need not prove a
reasonable likelihood that the violation itself will cause injury,
as PBS argues.44
In finding that the third Mathies requirement had been met, it noted the
testimony of the Secretary's expert witness that "miners who broke through
into a flooded adjacent mine would face numerous dangers of injury: drowning,
blocked escapeways, disrupted ventilation, [etc.]."4A

40

Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC at 3-4.

41

Musser Eng'g, Inc. & PBS Coals, 32 FMSHRC at 1280-81.
Id. at 1281 (internal quotations omitted).

42

4

Id. at 1280-81.
Id. at 1281.

45

Id

43
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The Commission's discussion of the third Mathies requirement in PBS
Coals, though brief and neglecting to make any citations to supporting legal
authority, seems to have taken the position that the inquiry under the third
Mathies requirement should consider whether an injury is reasonably likely to
occur, assuming that the contemplated hazardous event has occurred.46 In PBS
Coals, that event was a breakthrough into an adjacent and flooded mine. 4 7
The third Mathies element requires the Secretary to prove that the
hazard contributed to was reasonably likely to result in an injury. The analysis
in PBS Coals made that consideration assuming that the contemplated
inundation had actually occurred.48 Applying a similar analysis in other cases
would likely prove problematic. Rather than looking at the circumstances at the
time of the violation and asking, "is an accident reasonably likely to occur
going forward assuming continued normal mining operations," a fact-finder
would have to start from a situation in which the hazardous event has already
occurred, then ask "now that the contemplated accident has occurred, is an
injury reasonably likely to result?" The Commission's discussion on this issue
did not contain any limiting language. Rather, the majority's discussion was
framed as though it were simply correcting PBS's misinterpretation of the
existing significant and substantial test under Mathies.4 9 PBS Coals was the
first time the Commission performed the analysis this way; however, the
following year, it would apply the significant and substantial test in a very
similar way in CumberlandCoal Resources, LP.
B.

Cumberland Coal Resources, LP

50
Cumberland Coal Resources, LP ("Cumberland")
was just the right
set of circumstances to revisit the analysis that was briefly introduced in PBS
Coals. In Cumberland, MSHA had issued four citations for alleged violations
of a mandatory safety standard relating to escapeways.5 1 The particular
standard at issue requires such escapeways to be provided with a durable,

continuous lifeline that "shall be . . . [1]ocated in such a manner for miners to

use effectively to escape."5 2 On an inspection in late 2007, an MSHA inspector
examined the primary and secondary escapeways in several locations at

46

See id.

47

Id. at 1280.
Id

48

See id. at 1280-81.
33 FMSHRC 2357 (2011).
51
Id. at 2358-59.
52
30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7)(iv) (2012). The lifeline is a continuous, directional cord
with
reflective tape and reflectors which extends all the way to the portal of the mine through both the
primary and secondary escapeways. Id. § 75.380(d)(7).
49

50
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Cumberland's Cumberland Mine.5 3 In all of the areas, the lifeline was
suspended from the roof at an approximate average height of a bit over seven
and a half feet. 54 It was suspended at that height with J-hooks, which were not
all turned the same way. The inspector issued four violations of the regulation
over a period of several days. On the first day, he examined the secondary
escapeway for a distance of approximately 6,500 feet. He alleged that in
addition to the height of the lifeline and placement of the J-hooks, there were
several additional cables hung from the roof just under the lifeline, which
would prevent a miner from flipping the lifeline off of the J-hooks and would
hinder miners' use of the lifeline.58 The next day, the inspector examined the
primary escapeway, finding that for a distance of approximately 450 feet, the
lifeline was routed over "various pieces of track equipment," all of which were
"at least seven feet wide, and between three and five feet high."59 A few days
later, during a spot inspection, the inspector examined the primary escapeway
in a different area of the mine, finding that the lifeline was run over track
equipment in several places, similar to the previous citation.6 0 The next day, he
issued the fourth citation, having observed similar conditions in the primary
escapeway in yet another area of the mine.61
In the initial litigation before the ALJ, the Secretary argued that the
third element of the Mathies test "must be viewed in the context of continuing
mining operations and of an emergency necessitating use of the escapeway, and
by extension, the lifeline." 62 At the hearing on the merits, the ALJ disagreed,
characterizing the third element of the Mathies test as inquiring whether there
was a reasonable likelihood of an injury-producing event, and concluding that
the Secretary had failed to carry her burden in proving that such a reasonable
likelihood existed.6 3 In so finding, the judge noted that the "Secretary has failed
to adduce the existence of facts that, in normal mining operations, would have
tended to establish that there was a reasonable likelihood of a fire or

Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2358-59.
See id. at 2358-60.
ss
Id. at 2358-61. The hooks used were four-inch long hooks shaped like the letter "J." These
hooks "were attached to the mine roof at the top, were open-sided, and curved upward at the
bottom to hold the lifeline." Id. at 2358.
53

54

56

Id. at 2361.

5

Id. at 2358.
Id.

5
59
60
61

Id. at 2359.
Id. at 2360.
Id.

Id at 2361 (citing Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 31 FMSHRC 1147, 1163-64 n.6 (2009))
(internal quotations omitted).
62

63

Id.
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explosion[,]" and thus had failed to establish the reasonable likelihood of an
64
injury-producing event.
The Secretary appealed the judge's findings that the four violations
were not significant and substantial.65 She argued that in evaluating whether the
violations at issue were significant and substantial, the judge "should have
assumed the occurrence of the sort of emergency contemplated by the
standard." 66 In addition, she argued that the judge's approach would lead to the
absurd situation that violations of emergency standards 67 alleged by MSHA
would rarely, if ever, be found to be significant and substantial, and would be
"effectively immunized from the Mine Act's graduated enforcement scheme,"
in spite of their "especially high capacity for producing catastrophic injuries."68
The operator's position was that the judge had correctly applied the significant
and substantial analysis as set forth in Mathies, that the Mathies criteria must be
viewed based on the particular facts surrounding the violation and, thus, that it
was improper to assume the existence of an emergency situation.69
Before turning to conduct its analysis regarding whether the violations
were significant and substantial, the Commission engaged in a brief discussion
of the legislative and regulatory history of the mandatory safety standard at
issue, section 75.380.70 The primary emphasis of the Commission's two
paragraph discussion was on the grave dangers faced by miners in emergency
situations, and on the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of
2006's ("MINER Act") stated principal aim of increasing the safety of miners
in such *emergency situations. 71
The Commission began its analysis with a brief discussion of the
established meaning of significant and substantial under National Gypsum,
Mathies, U.S. Steel I, and U.S. Steel II.72 It is of note that although it cited U.S.
Steel II in its discussion, the Commission did not refer to the long-accepted
language therein, that the third Mathies element "requires that the Secretary
establish a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an

6

65
66

Id.
Id at 2362.

Id

67
Id. Regulatory standards setting forth requirements relating to escapeways, lifelines, and
other emergency preparedness obligations required under the Mine Improvement and New
Emergency Response Act of 2006. MINER Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493
(codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2362 (internal quotations omitted).
69

See id

30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7)(iv) (2012) (providing that "escapeway[s] shall be ... [p]rovided
with a continuous, durable directional lifeline or equivalent device that shall be . . . [I]ocated in
such a manner for miners to use effectively to escape").
71
See CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2362-63.
72
See discussion infra Part V.
70
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event in which there is an injury."7 Rather, it cited U.S. Steel II for another oftcited proposition that "it is the contribution of the violation to the cause and
effect of a hazard that must be significant and substantial." 4 It noted with
approval the AL's findings regarding the first two Mathies elements.7 ' The
ALJ had concluded that the first element was satisfied by his determination of
the four violations of section 75.380(d)(7)(iv), and that the second element, the
discrete safety hazard contributed to by the violations, was "miners not
escaping quickly in an emergency with attendant increased risk of injuries due
to a delay in escape."7 6 The Commission further noted that "[t]he hazard
contributed to by defectively placed lifelines necessarily involved consideration
of an emergency situation."77
As stated above, the central disagreement between Cumberland and the
Secretary was whether it was proper to assume the existence of an emergency
situation in the context of the third Mathies requirement in the significant and
substantial analysis. The Commission made several references in support of its
agreement with the Secretary's position. First, the Commission discussed its
recent decision in PBS Coals, stating that "importantly, we clarified that the
'Secretary need not prove a reasonable likelihood that the violation itself will
cause injury.' 7 The Commission also noted a proposition that it had adopted
on several occasions, that "the absence of an injury-producing event when a
cited practice has occurred does not preclude a determination of [significant
and substantial]."
Interestingly, the Commission proceeded to characterize Cumberland's
and the judge's position as requiring the imposition of an additional test not set
forth in Mathies, "a test of whether emergency conditions would likely occur at
the mine.,,s It explained, "[we have] never required the establishment of the
reasonable likelihood of a fire, explosion, or other emergency event when
considering whether violations of evacuation standards are [significant and
substantial]."sI

The majority placed great emphasis on the concept of "evacuation
standards" and explained that "[e]vacuation standards are different from other

7

U.S. Steel Mining Co., 6 FMSHRC 1834, 1836 (1984).

74
Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2364 (citing U.S. Steel Mining Co., 6
FMSHRC at 1836).
7

Id.

Id. at 2364 (quoting Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 31 FMSHRC at 1163 (2009)).
See id.
78 Id. at 2365 (quoting Musser Eng'g, Inc. & PBS Coals, Inc., 32 FMSHRC 1257, 1281
(2010)).
7
Id. (citing Musser Eng'g,Inc. & PBS Coals, Inc., 32 FMSHRC at 1281).
80
Id. at 2366.
76

n

8'

Id
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mine safety standards. They are intended to apply meaningfully only when an
emergency actually occurs." 82 The passage and purpose of the MINER Act also
played a role in the Commission's adoption of the Secretary's rationale. 83 The
Commission noted that Congress's principal rationale in passing the MINER
Act was to ensure "safe and effective mine evacuations in emergency
situations," arguing that "it would be incongruous for major violations of
evacuation standards not to be [significant and substantial] unless an inspector
also happens to observe conditions that are reasonably likely to cause a fire or
explosion." 84 Although the Commission did not define, discuss in depth, or
purport to limit its holding to "evacuation standards," it is clear that the analysis
and holding in Cumberland were significantly influenced by, if not compelled
by, the fact that the particular regulations at issue were evacuation standards.
The Commission further argued that adopting the operator's position "would
lead to the absurd result of defeating the purpose of the standard."85
It is worth noting the magnitude and variety of justifications put forth
by the Commission in reaching its holding regarding the third Mathies
requirement in Cumberland. It referenced its prior holding in PBS Coals, the
legislative and regulatory history of the 2006 MINER Act and section
75.380(d)(7)(iv), and argued that evacuation standards are special and different
from other standards.86 Yet, at the same time, it argued that "the Commission is
not changing Mathies."87 Rather, it continued, it was simply "focusing on the
specific 'discrete safety hazard' at issue here, as required by the second element
of the Mathies test."8 8
With that issue settled, the Commission handily dispensed with
Cumberland's remaining arguments that, even assuming an emergency, an
injury would not be reasonably likely to occur. 89 On this point, the Commission
referenced the judge's agreement with the inspector's testimony regarding the
hazards which would be encountered in an emergency situation with poor

visibility. 9 0

82

Id.

83
MINER Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493 (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.). In fact, the Commission took several paragraphs of its opinion to discuss the
legislative history and purpose of the MINER Act and § 75.380(d)(7)(iv). See CumberlandCoal
Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2362-64.
84
CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2367 (emphasis added).
86

Id (citing Central Sand & Gravel Co., 23 FMSHRC 250, 254 (2001)).
Id. at 2367-68.

87

Id. at 2368.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 2369.
Id.

90
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As a preface to its endorsement of the clarification put forth in PBS
Coals, the Commission noted the well-established precedent that "the absence
of an injury-producing event when a cited practice has occurred does not
preclude a determination of significant and substantial."9 ' This innocuous
proposition is a far cry from the sea change represented by the Secretary's
reading of PBS Coals and Cumberland. The central holding of these two cases
cited by the Commission on this point is simply that the lack of prior accidents
or injuries resulting from situations similar to the alleged conditions do not
preclude a finding of significant and substantial. 92 This proposition is
uncontroversial and completely consistent with the forty years of significant
and substantial precedent discussed below. The Commission also cited Maple
Creek Mining, Inc. in support of its position that an emergency should be
assumed when considering whether violations of evacuation standards are
significant and substantial.9 3 However, the only decision which truly supports
the treatment of the third Mathies element in Cumberland is PBS Coals, in
which the Commission "clarified" the forty-year-old significant and substantial
analysis out of whole-cloth.
Black Beauty Coal Co.

C.

While the Commission has not had the opportunity to analyze this issue
further since Cumberland, in August 2012, it reaffirmed its position in Black
Beauty Coal Co. ("Black Beauty").94 In Black Beauty, MSHA alleged that the
operator had violated 30 C.F.R. § 77.1605(k), which provides that "berms or
guards shall be provided on the outer bank of elevated roadways," by failing to
construct a berm on a road built to transport a drill rig.95 The operator
contended that the alleged conditions did not constitute a violation.96 At the
hearing, the judge held that this was a significant and substantial violation of
the regulation.97 On appeal, the operator argued that the judge erred in her
Id. (citing Musser Eng'g, Inc. & PBS Coals, Inc., 32 FMSHRC 1257, 1281 (2010)).
Elk Run Coal Co., 27 FMSHRC 899, 907 (2005); Blue Bayou Sand & Gravel, Inc., 18
FMSHRC 853, 857 (1996). An argument made in the past by operators was that it was the
Secretary's burden to put on evidence of prior accidents at the same mine or at similar mines in
order to prove that a given violation was reasonably likely to result in an injury-producing event.
This argument has been advanced and rejected a number of times. In fact, it was advanced and
rejected in PBS Coals.Musser Eng'g,Inc. & PBS Coals, 32 FMSHRC at 1281.
9
See Cumberland, 33 FMSHRC at 2366 (citing Maple Creek Mining, Inc., 27 FMSHRC
555, 563-64 (2005)); see also discussion infra Part VII.
94
Black Beauty Coal Co., No. LAKE 2008-477 (Fed. Mine Safety and Health Rev. Comm'n
Aug.
2,
2012),
available
at
http://www.fmshrc.gov/decisions/commission/
COMM.08022012.LAKE21008-477d.htm.
95
Id
96
Id
91
92

97

Id.
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findings both on the fact of the violation and with respect to the significant and
substantial designation. The Commission first upheld the judge's finding of
the violation, primarily crediting the judge's evaluation of the photograph of
the cited area that had been submitted into evidence.9 9 Upon affirming the
violation, the Commission proceeded to analyze each Mathies element. It first
expressed agreement with the judge's definition of the hazard contributed to:
"the danger of a vehicle veering off the elevated roadway and rolling, or
falling, down the spoil incline." 100 The operator contended that an injury was
unlikely because it was unlikely that an incident of overtravel would occur
during continued normal mining operations.10 1 In dispensing with that
argument, the Commission relied on PBS Coals and Cumberland,stating that
"[the relevant inquiry] is whether the hazard in question-a vehicle veering off
the road because of a lack of berms-would be reasonably likely to cause

injury."902
Also notable is the Commission's correction of the Secretary's analysis
at oral argument on this issue. Perhaps sensing that the analysis established by
the Commission in PBS Coals and Cumberland was not quite set in stone,
MSHA attempted to analogize the standard requiring berms as a type of
03
emergency standard, like the lifeline regulations at issue in Cumberland.1
This was unnecessary and inappropriate, according to the Commission, because
"the correct inquiry under the third element of Mathies is whether the hazard
identified under element two is reasonably likely to cause injury." 04 Its
discussion of how this particular standard was not an emergency standard
makes clear again that this analytical framework is intended to be applied to all
safety and health standards.' 0 5
It is reasonable to wonder how what appears to be a significant
analytical change could be made while the Commission could, at the same
time, put forth the argument that it was simply correcting the operator's
misinterpretation of the analysis established long ago in Mathies. It was able to
do that by overlooking the substance of Mathies and the other cases discussed
infra, and instead focusing on a small linguistic ambiguity in the Commission's
original construction of the Mathies test. In Mathies, and all the cases that cited
it thereafter, the third significant and substantial criterion was defined as "a

98

Id

99

Id

1oo Id
101 Id
102

Id.

103
104

Id
id

105

id.
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reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an injury."l 06
Because of the verbiage used, it is possible to superimpose two different
meanings onto the stated requirement. One possible meaning is the one
0 7
advanced by the Commission in PBS Coals and Cumberland.1
This
question-whether the identified hazard contributed to by the particular
violation at issue would be reasonably likely to result in an injury if that hazard
were to actually culminate in an injury-producing event-is consistent with the
language quoted above from the third element of the Mathies significant and
substantial test. However, there is an alternate construction that is also
consistent with that language. This other interpretation of the language requires
us to frame the question in the context of whether this identified hazard is of
the type that we would actually expect to result in an injury in absolute, reallife terms, looking forward from the present. This alternate construction has
been applied almost uniformly over the past forty years, as discussed in the
case analyses below.
The clarification of the Mathies analysis offered by the Commission in
PBS Coals appears to create a layer of assumption that did not exist prior to
that case: that, somehow, circumstances have aligned such that the violation
has already resulted in the contemplated injury-producing event. The
Commission explained this as simply "focusing on the specific 'discrete safety
hazard' at issue. 08 The disconnect, however, is that the purpose of the third
Mathies requirement was to require the Secretary to establish a certain
threshold of likelihood. That purpose is lost when the third element requires
consideration of a situation where the hazard has already occurred. Adding
such an assumption into the analysis renders the third Mathies requirement
almost meaningless, an effect which itself is inconsistent with the fact that
since Mathies was decided, most disputes in mine safety litigation regarding
whether a violation is significant and substantial have revolved around the third
Mathies requirement. It also renders meaningless the established contour that
circumstances are to be considered in the context of "continued normal mining
operations."'l09 Continued normal mining operations are hardly relevant if we
are considering a situation in which the contemplated event has already
occurred. However, none of this discussion is relevant if the Commission has,
in fact, "not changed Mathies."110 However, if it has, the practical effect of the
Cumberland significant and substantial analysis will be the creation of the
presumption of significant and substantial that the Commission has so many

Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1, 3 (1984).
See Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC 2357, 2366 (2011); Musser Eng'g, Inc. &
PBS Coals, Inc., 32 FMSHRC 1257, 1280-81 (2010).
108 CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2368.
109
For a discussion of Commission case law, see infra Part IV.
no CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2368.
106
107
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times rejected. It also suggests that mine safety lawyers, including nearly all
current and former ALJs and Commissioners, have simply been getting it
wrong for forty years.
At the same time, there are some decisions that lend some support to
the argument that violations of evacuation standards could be considered in the
context of an emergency event. Although that proposition has never been
explicitly addressed or adopted by the Commission, it is at least not facially
inconsistent with the bulk of Commission precedent and moreover has some
level of intuitive appeal. However, the Commission did not advance this
proposition in PBS Coals or Cumberland. The discussion regarding the third
Mathies element in both of these was not limited to violations of evacuation
standards or any other class of regulations. What is equally notable is that the
language of both opinions characterizes the discussion as a "clarification" and
suggests that this is the way the Mathies test was constructed all along.' But is
that really the case?
The next two parts of this Article discuss the IBMA and Commission
decisions that defined the contours of the significant and substantial analysis,
and how they have continued to refine it over the last forty years. With the
benefit of this discussion, one may be in a position to make their own judgment
as to whether the Commission was indeed just applying Mathies.
IV. DEFINING SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL-CASES UNDER THE INTERIOR
BOARD OF MINE OPERATIONS APPEALS

With a convoluted statute and a conspicuous lack of any congressional
guidance after the passage of the 1969 Coal Act, it was left to the courts to
flesh out what Congress intended the federal enforcement scheme applicable to
American mines to be. At this point, significant and substantial was not even a
designation, and the questions that arose in litigation principally dealt with the
factors necessary for the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration's
("MESA," MSHA's precursor agency) issuance of withdrawal orders under
section 104(c)(1) of the Coal Act. Indeed, at this early stage, the issues in mine
safety litigation bore little resemblance to the neat and orderly series of
designations and relatively clear analytical framework we deal with today. It is
at this point that long and dramatic defining process of significant and
substantial begins.
Under the 1969 Coal Act, the judicial body charged with adjudicating
disputes between mine operators and MESA was the IBMA; similar to the way
the review process is structured today, ALJs functioned as the initial fact-finder
and trial court with the IBMA providing an avenue for appeal.

"'

See id. at 2367-69; Musser Eng'g,Inc. &PBS Coals, Inc., 32 FMSHRC at 1280-81.
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1974-Eastern Associated Coal Corp.

The IBMA was first called upon to interpret the significant and
substantial language in section 104(c) of the Coal Act in Eastern Associated
Coal Corp. ("Eastern Associated'), a mine operator's appeal of an ALJ
decision upholding a withdrawal order, decided in 1974.112 In Eastern
Associated, MESA alleged that the operator violated the Secretary's roof
control regulations by failing to follow its approved roof control plan." 3 The
inspector determined that the operator had failed to limit the width of the
roadway to the required maximum of sixteen feet in the cited location, as
required under the operator's approved roof control plan.1 14 The operator
presented a number of arguments, among them that the condition identified did
not constitute a violation of the regulation, and that the closure order was
improper.1 5 Because the inspector had issued a closure order under section
104(c) of the Coal Act, he had implicitly represented that the alleged conditions
significantly and substantially contributed to the cause and effect of a mine
safety hazard, as this much is required by the statutory language." 6 The
operator did not raise a specific challenge to that implicit finding by the
inspector, but the IBMA's opinion in Eastern Associated would represent the
first attempt at interpreting the significant and substantial language which
appeared in the Coal Act, and which would again appear in the Mine Act in
1977.
Notably, in beginning its attempt at interpreting section 104(c)(1) of
the Coal Act, the IBMA stated that:
[w]hile we must stay within the confines of the actual language
of the [Coal] Act, we acknowledge that it is something less
than self-defining. Accordingly, we have decided, in addition
to the literal language, to be guided by our understanding of the
precise purposes of the 104(c) sanctions relative to the other
[enforcement powers granted to the Secretary]. 1 7
This assessment, that Congress provided little guidance, would be
echoed later by the Commission in its subsequent attempts at interpretation of

112

E. Assoc'd Coal Corp., 81 Interior Dec. 567 (IBMA 1974).

..

Id. at 572.

114

Id.
See id.
116
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 104(c), 83 Stat.
742, 751.
117 E. Assoc'd Coal Corp., 81 Interior Dec. at 574. The IBMA's observation
regarding this
section of the Coal Act's convoluted and undefined language would be echoed later by the
Commission in the context of its attempts at construing the identical language in Section 104(d)
of the Mine Act.
115
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the same language. The IBMA further noted that "section 104 as a whole was
designed and intended to provide the Secretary with a range of sharper
enforcement tools than previously existed, to deal with various classes of health
or safety hazards. The first three subsections of section 104 are concerned with
each of these distinct classes."" 8 It is section 104(c)(1) of the Coal Act that
contains the significant and substantial language we are concerned with, and
regarding which the IBMA's discussion is relevant. The IBMA first observed
that, as opposed to those falling under sections 104(a) and 104(b), conditions or
practices falling under section 104(c) treatment are subject to citation, closure,
and then continuing liability to closure, and, consequently, contain a degree of
seriousness beyond that required for mere citation under section 104(b).1 19
Upon concluding that one of the prerequisites for validity of a
withdrawal order issued under section 104(c)(2) was that the violation "could
significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a mine
safety or health hazard," the IBMA proceeded to make its findings. 12 0 The
operator had argued that the requirement was not met because the deviation
from the approved roof control plan was merely technical in nature, while the
inspector had testified that the lack of sufficient timbers presented a significant
hazard due to the operator's history of rock fall problems. 12 1 Finding for the
Secretary on the issue, the IBMA concluded that the alleged conditions were
significant and substantial because "the instant violation posed a probable risk
of serious bodily harm or death in the form of a roof collapse."1 22 It went on to
state in a footnote that "[if] we thought that the hazard in question had only a
of occurring, we would of course conclude
speculative1possibility
otherwise." 2 This initial construction of the significant and substantial
language would come to be referred to as the "probable risk test" and would
later be discarded in favor of a broader and more inclusive test. 124

118

Id. Section 104(a) provided the Secretary authority to issue withdrawal orders on a finding

of an "imminent danger" and is analogous to Section 107(a) of the Mine Act. Section 104(b)
granted the Secretary authority to issue a notice of violation for alleged infractions of mandatory
safety or health standards, regardless of seriousness or fault. Section 104(c)(2) provides a means
for subjecting operators to repeated withdrawal orders after certain conditions are met, and is
analogous to Section 104(d)(2) of the Mine Act.
"9
120

Id. at 574-76.
Id. at 576-77. A withdrawal order requires the operator to remove all miners from the

affected area except those necessary to correct the cited condition. One of the most severe
enforcement tools, a withdrawal order may only properly issue in circumstances which are very
dangerous, or which illustrate an extreme lack of care on the part of the mine operator.
121 Id. at 578.
122

Id.

123

Id at 578 n.7.
See Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 83 Interior Dec. 574, 577 (IBMA 1976).

124
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1975-Zeigler Coal Co.

While the IBMA was struggling to discern the meaning of the Coal
Act's section 104(c), among other provisions, and the enforcement framework
intended with their enactment, the particular meaning of the significant and
substantial language in section 104(c)(1) had already become a point of
contention. As was the case in Zeigler Coal Co., which involved a petition for
reconsideration of an IBMA reversal of the AL's initial upholding of the
validity of a withdrawal order. 125 In the initial decision, the ALJ determined
that he need not find that the violation significantly and substantially
contributed to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard in order to
uphold the issuance of the withdrawal order issued under Coal Act section
104(c)(1).1 2 6 The withdrawal order giving rise to the litigation was issued under
30 C.F.R. § 75.400, which, as it does now, proscribed accumulations of
combustible material.127 On the initial appeal to the IBMA, Zeigler had
contended that the withdrawal order was invalid on several grounds, the one
with which we are concerned being that the judge had erroneously concluded
that he need not find that the subject order could significantly and substantially
contribute to a mine safety or health hazard.12 8 In its disposition of the initial
appeal, the IBMA agreed with Zeigler on this point.129 MESA filed a petition
for reconsideration of the IBMA's reversal, giving rise to the subject opinion.130
In its petition, MESA, with support from the United Mineworkers of America
("UMWA"), argued for a literal interpretation of the significant and substantial
language, with emphasis on the word "could," from "could significantly and
substantially contribute."' 3 ' This, of course, would result in a much broader
application of the language, as opposed to the IBMA's existing interpretation,
which was based on its contextual interpretation in light of the language's
placement in the overall enforcement scheme. 13 2
In rejecting these arguments, and maintaining its non-literal interpretation
of section 104(c)(1), the IBMA made the poignant observation that "if we were
to give each of the words of that clause an ordinary meaning, it would become
a superfluous truism; by definition, the violation of any mandatory standard
could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a mine

125

126
127

128

82 Interior Dec. 221, 221 (IBMA 1975).
Id. at 222.

id
id.

Id at 222-23.
130
Id at 221.
131
Id. at 226-27; see also Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91173, § 104(c)(1), 83 Stat. 742, 751.
132
Zeigler Coal Co., 82 Interior Dec. at 228.
129
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safety or health hazard."3 " The IBMA also discussed several peculiarities of
the legislation, noting that neither "significant and substantial" nor
"unwarrantable failure" had been given binding definitions and further that
there existed a number of additional ambiguities in the language of sections
104(c)(1) and 104(c)(2). 13 4 In noting these circumstances, the IBMA concluded
that "the literal words are inconclusive on key points as to what Congress
intended."' 35 Returning to the central issue regarding the proper construction
and role of the significant and substantial language, it determined that these
questions could best be resolved "by looking to the purposes of section 104(c)
in the overall enforcement policy mandated by the Congress," an approach that
would later be rejected by the IBMA and later still reinstated by the
Commission.13 6
As the IBMA viewed the overall nature and policy of the Coal Act's
enforcement scheme, it was "a blend of measured deterrence and protective
reaction for the safety of affected miners, with each enforcement tool directed
toward a particular class of conditions or practices."l 37 The IBMA, with great
foresight, determined that the phrase "could significantly and substantially
contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard" was a
phrase of art.138 In construing the phrase, it noted the presence of the word
"hazard," which it believed to connote the language's intended application "not
to just any violation, but rather to violations posing a risk of serious bodily
harm or death."1 3 9 It further opined that the presence of the words "significantly
and substantially" connoted a probability requirement, "designed in [the
IBMA's] opinion, to prevent application of section 104(c) to largely
speculative hazards."1 40 This assessment concluded the IBMA's decision
regarding the significant and substantial language, with the remaining
discussion dedicated to issues regarding the relation of the same to MESA's
ability to issue imminent danger and unwarrantable failure withdrawal
orders. 141

113

Id. at 229.

134

Id at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.

131
136

'"

Id

13

id

140

Id (internal quotations omitted).
See id
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1976-Alabama By-Products Corp.

It was the IBMA's decision in Alabama By-Products Corp. ("Alabama
By-Products") that would be its final meaningful discussion of the significant
and substantial language before the passage of the 1977 Mine Act and the
IBMA's replacement by the FMSHRC.14 2 Unlike in Eastern Associated, the
construction of the significant and substantial language in section 104(c) was
one of the central issues in Alabama By-Products.14 3 In this case, the operator
sought to challenge two withdrawal orders issued to it under section 104(c)(1)
of the 1969 Coal Act on the basis that the conditions alleged were not of such a
nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect
of a mine safety or health hazard.144
On initial consideration, the ALJ had applied the Eastern Associated
"probable risk" test and had determined that the cited violation "did not pose a
probable risk of serious bodily harm short of imminent danger" and thus did
not fulfill the requirements of the significant and substantial clause in section
104(c)(1). While the IBMA had initially affirmed the AL's ruling, it stayed the
effect of its decision pending the resolution of the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in International Union, United Mine Workers of America v.
Kleppe ("UMWA v. Kleppe").145 The issue in UMWA v. Kleppel4 6 related to the
proper interpretation of the statutory requirements necessary for the issuance of
subsequent unwarrantable failure withdrawal orders, after the first one, under
section 104(c)(1) of the Coal Act.147 The particular question at issue was
whether Congress intended to apply the significant and substantial gravity
criterion to the second sentence of section 104(c)(1), and therefore require an
additional gravity prerequisite to be met before a withdrawal order could
properly issue.148 The D.C. Circuit did not interpret the significant and
substantial language in UMWA v. Kleppe. Rather, it only considered whether
the language in section 104(c)(1) created an implied gravity prerequisite for
proper issuance of a withdrawal order under section 104(c)(1).1 4 9 While the
IBMA agreed with the operator that the D.C. Circuit's holding was narrow and
did not address the meaning of the significant and substantial language in

Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 83 Interior Dec. 574 (IBMA 1976).
Id. at 578 ("There remains, however, the question of how the 'significant and substantial'
language should now be interpreted.").
'4
Id at 574-75.
145 Id. at 575.
146
Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Kleppe, 532 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
147
Id. at 1404. This related to the application of the Coal Act version of what we now refer to
as the "d-chain" or "d-sequence" under Section 104(d) of the Mine Act.
148
Id. at 1405.
142

143

149

See id; Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 83 Interior Dec. at 576.
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section 104(c)(1), it opined that the D.C. Circuit's opinion had broader
implications such that a change in the interpretation of the significant and
substantial language was necessary in any event.150
Where the IBMA had previously taken into consideration both the
overall enforcement scheme and the relation of section 104(c) to the other
statutory enforcement tools after concluding that the language of section 104(c)
was unclear, the D.C. Circuit, while not commenting on the IBMA's contextual
approach, applied a strictly literal interpretation of the statutory language.s15 In
light of the D.C. Circuit's reliance on the text alone in construing Congress's
intent regarding the application of withdrawal orders, the IBMA concluded that
the D.C. Circuit's rejection of the IBMA's contextual approach necessarily
implied a corresponding rejection of that same reasoning which was used by
the IBMA in interpreting the significant and substantial language.
Accordingly, it proceeded to re-interpret the significant and substantial
language in the literal and broader fashion employed by the D.C. Circuit, as
urged by MESA and the UMWA.1 53
The practical consequence of this decision was the rejection of the
IBMA's previously established "probable risk" formulation of significant and
substantial. 154 It is important to note that none of the various parties, in
advancing their own preferred meanings, referenced any legislative history
directly addressing the meaning of the phrase "significant and substantial."
MESA and the UMWA argued that the type of violations referred to by
Congress were those which "pose a reasonable possibility of danger to the
health and safety of miners."15 Framing its adopted definition in the negative,
the IBMA went even further, holding that significant and substantial meant all
violations except those which pose no risk at all, that is, "purely technical
violations," and those "posing a source of injury which has only a remote or
speculative chance of coming to fruition."' 5 7
The IBMA's decision in Alabama By-Products represented a
significant broadening of what violations were considered significant and
substantial under section 104(c)(1) of the Coal Act. It explicitly rejected
Eastern Associated's "probable risk" formulation and represented the IBMA's
final word on the significant and substantial language before the IBMA was
replaced by the FMSHRC. While the scope of what violations would be
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Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 83 Interior Dec. at 576.
Id. at 577.
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considered significant and substantial would broaden and narrow over its forty
plus years of life, Alabama By-Products represented significant and substantial
at its very broadest. With the passage of the 1977 Mine Act, MSHA replaced
MESA, and the FMSHRC replaced the IBMA. Shortly after this transition
occurred, the Commission was called upon to consider the nearly identical
issue of what Congress intended by the significant and substantial language
contained in what was now section 104(d) of the 1977 Mine Act.
V. THE DEFINING CONTINUES-CASES THAT SHAPED SIGNIFICANT AND
SUBSTANTIAL UNDER THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW
COMMISSION: NATIONAL GYPSUM, MATHIES COAL CO., AND MORE

A.

Cement Division, National Gypsum Co.

In Cement Division, National Gypsum Co.,' 58 decided in 1981, the
Commission laid the foundation of what would remain the significant and
substantial test for over forty years. Indeed, the question of what constitutes a
significant and substantial violation under the Mine Act was the central issue in
National Gypsum. The case was an appeal by a mine operator from an ALJ
ruling upholding the inspector's significant and substantial designations for
nine out of eleven citations at issue.159 In the ALJ decision, the judge
"reluctantly agreed with the Secretary's position that a violation is of a
significant and substantial nature if it presents more than a remote or
speculative possibility that any injury or illness may occur . . . .,160 The

operator argued that the Secretary's definition was overly inclusive, appealing
the ALJ ruling on the same basis, and thus the issue was before the
Commission.161
In reversing the judge's test as being overly inclusive and erroneous,
the Commission concluded that a violation is
of such a nature as could significantly and substantially
contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health
hazard if, based upon the particular facts surrounding that
violation, there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard
contributed to will result in an injury or illness of a reasonably
serious nature. 62
This analysis has remained the core of the significant and substantial test since
National Gypsum was rendered. Though the Commission's intent would be

1ss

3 FMSHRC 822 (1981).

160

Id. at 824.
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clear from the decisions that followed, it was an ambiguity in that verbiage that
would result in the confusion we are encountering today.
The first task of the Commission in National Gypsum was to explain
why the definition of significant and substantial advanced by the Secretary was
wrong and over-inclusive. In doing so, it noted that the Secretary's proffered
definitionl 6 3 would result in nearly all violations qualifying as significant and
substantial and thus would render the significant and substantial language in
section 104(d)(1) superfluous. 164 The Commission also emphasized the
deleterious effect on mine operators such a broad definition would have when
implemented in concert with the pattern of violations provisions of section
104(e). 165 This point remains valid today, more so than ever. The economic and
reputational harm that results from being placed on a pattern of violations
treatment remains undisputable.
Resolving a great deal of statutory ambiguity, the Commission set forth
a specific definition for the term "hazard" in section 104(d) of the Mine Act,
and further explained what type of violation "significantly and substantially
contributes to the cause and effect of a ... hazard." 6 6 It opined that a hazard
was "a measure of danger to safety or health, and that a violation 'significantly
and substantially' contributes to the cause and effect of a hazard if the violation
could be a major cause of a danger to safety or health."1 6 7 The language used
here is important, as evident from the above discussion of PBS Coals and
Cumberland.The Commission continued, stating "the contribution to cause and
effect must be significant and substantial."6 s
In settling on the definition above, the Commission reasoned that its
definition was consistent with the reasonable proposition that a significant and
substantial violation was intended to fall on the spectrum between the mere fact
of a violation and a violation which would constitute an imminent danger. 6' It
also heavily emphasized the Mine Act's graduated enforcement scheme, which
provides for increasingly harsh sanctions for more serious and continued
violations.170

Id. "[A] violation is of a significant and substantial nature, so long as it poses more
than a
remote or speculative chance that an injury or illness will result, no matter how slight that injury
or illness. . . ."Id
163

'6

Id at 826.

Id. at 827. A mine operator placed on a "pattern of violations" treatment ("POV") is
subject to significantly increased civil penalties and the risk of repeated closures and loss of
production. Id
116 Id. at 825.
165

167 Id at 827.
168 id
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Id. at 828.
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One may be wondering how the Commission formulated the abovedescribed test and definitions. After reviewing the Mine Act and its legislative
history and finding the references to significant and substantial "contradictory"
and "at times directly at odds with the Act's language," the Commission
concluded that these sources were not helpful in resolving the issue.171 It
proceeded essentially to craft the above test and definitions out of whole-cloth
based on what it perceived the goals and framework of the Act to be.1 72
Nonetheless, the framework set forth in National Gypsum continues to endure,
despite its re-crafting in PBS Coals and Cumberland.
Mathies Coal Co.

B.

While National Gypsum established the foundation for the significant
and substantial test under Commission practice, it was Mathies Coal Co. that
set forth a clear analytical framework, along with what would come to be
referred to as "the Mathies significant and substantial test."" Moreover,
Mathies is more informative with regard to this Article's discussion of the third
Mathies requirement because it involves the application of the significant and
substantial test to a specific violation rather than the abstract discussion in
National Gypsum. In Mathies, the operator appealed the AL's determination
that the single violation at issue was significant and substantial under the
framework set forth in National Gypsum.
In Mathies, an MSHA inspector cited the mine operator for having
defective sanders on a self-propelled personnel carrier ("mantrip").174 The
mantrip was used by the operator to transport miners to and from the working
section in groups of eight to ten men at a time.175 While it was equipped with
primary and secondary braking systems, the mantrip was also equipped with a
sander above each of its four wheels. When necessary, the sanders could be
activated to supplement the other braking systems by dispensing sand in order
to increase the friction between the wheels and the haulage track.17 6 One of the
sanders on the mantrip in question had a valve stuck and ran out of sand. 77
This is the condition that was cited and was alleged to be significant and
substantial.17 8 The mantrip would be used twice a day to transport eight to ten

1'
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Id at 829.
Id. at 829-30.
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Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1 (1984).
Id. at 2.

'"

Id

176

Id

178

id

'

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

1078

[Vol. 115

miners on a twenty minute, 6,500 foot trip.179 It was noted that the mine was
generally wet, and that over the journey on the day in question the mantrip's
route contained curves, blind curves, an S-curve, and hills with as great as a
3.4% grade.180
Applying the National Gypsum formulation, the AU concluded that
the hazard associated with the violation was a sliding derailment or a collision
with an object on the tracks and that the wetness of the haulageway, along with
the curves and downgrades in the mine, made a reasonably serious injury
reasonably likely to occur.181 In reviewing the judge's findings, the
Commission reformatted the National Gypsum requirements into the four-part
Mathies test.182 It stated that in order to establish that a violation of a mandatory
safety standard is significant and substantial, the Secretary must prove:
(1) the underlying violation of a mandatory safety standard;
(2) a discrete safety hazard-that is, a measure of danger to
safety-contributed to by the violation;
(3) a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will
result in an injury; and
(4) a reasonable likelihood that the injury in question will be of
a reasonably serious nature.' 83
The dispute in Mathies, like most subsequent disputes regarding
significant and substantial, largely focused on the third required element,
whether there existed a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to
would result in an injury.184 The analysis applied in Mathies is informative in
considering the propriety of the significant and substantial analysis in PBS
Coals and Cumberland. The hazard identified by the AU and affirmed by the
Commission was "a sliding derailment or collision with some object on the
tracks." 85 Given that it was established that the mantrip in question transported
miners, 186 an analysis under the test contemplated in Cumberlandwould likely
end there. It is difficult to imagine a scenario involving a derailment or
collision of a mantrip transporting miners that would not engender a reasonable
likelihood of reasonably serious injuries. Of course, the Commission's analysis

'n
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ISO Id
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Id at 4.
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in Mathies did not end upon its determination that the hazard contributed to
was a sliding derailment or collision. Indeed, the factors it went on to discuss
all related to the issue of whether such a sliding derailment or collision was
reasonably likely to occur given the conditions present and which could be
reasonably expected.18 In concluding that such an incident was reasonably
likely to occur, the Commission again emphasized the presence of curves,
grades, and the exceptional wetness present on the day the violation was

issued.188
While National Gypsum and Mathies are the seminal cases in the line
interpreting the Mine Act's significant and substantial language, the
Commission issued several other important decisions in the years that followed,
which served to clarify and add further contours to the analysis.
U.S. Steel I

C.

Several months later, in U.S. Steel Mining Co., Inc. ("U.S. Steel l"),18 9
the Commission established the proposition that the significant and substantial
analysis is to be considered in terms of "continued normal mining operations,"
rather than simply taking into consideration the circumstances as they existed at
the precise moment the inspector observed the alleged violation. 190 Although a
rather concise opinion, U.S. Steel I was quite important and continues to guide
the significant and substantial analysis today.
In U.S. Steel I, MSHA argued that a six-inch cut in a continuous miner
cable observed by an inspector constituted a significant and substantial
violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.517.'9' It was established during the proceedings
that approximately two inches of the cut had been covered by electrical tape,
leaving exposed approximately four inches of ground wire.19 2 The cited cable
also contained three live power wires carrying 480 volts, which were all
covered by a separate, inner layer of insulation, undamaged at the time of
inspection. 19 3 MSHA argued that these circumstances constituted a significant
and substantial violation while U.S. Steel argued that the scope of consideration
for determining whether a significant and substantial violation exists should be
limited to the conditions as they existed when inspected.19 4

"

Id. at 4.

188

Id.
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6 FMSHRC 1573 (1984).

.90 Id. at 1574.
'19 Id. at 1573.
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Rejecting U.S. Steel's proposed construction of the significant and
substantial test, the Commission opined that "such a measurement cannot
ignore the relevant dynamics of the mining environment or processes[,]"
further stating that "this cable was in normal use at the time it was observed by
the inspector."19 5 It went on to explicitly endorse the AL's consideration of
"those mining conditions to which the damaged cable predictably would be

exposed."l 9 6
The consideration of events that would be expected to occur under
continued normal mining operations is reasonable in the context of the
significant and substantial analysis. Under the line of reasoning urged by U.S.
Steel, a similar violation could not be cited as significant and substantial until
both the outer and inner layers of insulation were damaged and the cable was in
active use. 197 It is unclear how the Commission sitting at that time would have
resolved the issue had the continuous mining machine been idle and the cable
de-energized. Nonetheless, with U.S. Steel I, it was established that the
significant and substantial analysis was to be conducted assuming "continued
normal mining operations."' 98
While neither the ALJ nor the Commission explicitly stated as much, it
is reasonable to posit that the discrete safety hazard at issue in U.S. Steel I was
a miner accidently handling an inadequately protected 480 volt trailing cable
and sustaining electrical shock injuries. 199 Like with the sliding derailment
hazard in Mathies, under the Cumberland formulation, the significant and
substantial analysis could easily be concluded once the discrete safety hazard
was determined to be a shock from a 480 volt cable. But again, the Commission
continued the analysis and discussed the third Mathies element.200 Indeed, it is
not unreasonable to argue that the very concept of continued normal mining
operations which arose from U.S. Steel I came about because the Commission
was considering whether such a shock injury was reasonably likely to actually
occur. Consider the distinction between that question and the question that
would be relevant under the Cumberland formulation-whether an incident
involving an electrical shock would be reasonably likely to result in a
reasonably serious injury.
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U.S. Steel II

D.

An additional facet of the significant and substantial analysis, and
indeed the one that is directly in support of the thesis of this Article, was
established later the same year in U.S. Steel Mining Co., Inc. ("U.S. Steel
I1). 20 1 In U.S. Steel II, the issue of what violations are properly designated
significant and substantial was again before the Commission, this time in
regard to two contested enforcement actions, which had been found by the ALJ
to be significant and substantial.202 It was in U.S. Steel II that the Commission
precisely addressed the issue later "clarified" in PBS Coals and Cumberland,
stating that "[w]e . . . note that our reference to hazard in the third element in

Mathies contemplates the possibility of a subsequent event. This requires that
the Secretary establish a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to
will result in an event in which there is an injury." 203
As stated above, U.S. Steel II involved the application of the Mathies
significant and substantial test to two alleged violations. The first violation
alleged was that three electrical plugs connected to a section power center
"were not properly tagged, or otherwise identified, to correspond with the
receptacles" on the power center.204 The three plugs belonged to two shuttle car
cables and one continuous miner cable.20 5 The ALJ found that the continuous
miner cable was visually very different from the two shuttle car cables and thus
could not be confused with the shuttle car cables.206 The Commission agreed
that the particular hazard presented was an electrical shock resulting from a
miner having mistaken the unmarked shuttle car trailing cable for a similar
looking plug and handled the cable while energized. 2 0 7 U.S. Steel argued that
the record did not support the AL's implicit holding that such an incident was
reasonably likely to occur. 2 0 8
The only requirement under the Mathies test at issue in U.S. Steel I
was the third element, whether the hazard was reasonably likely to result in an
injury. In determining that such an event was reasonably likely to occur, the
Commission discussed the circumstances present, also noting that a fatal
electrocution accident had occurred at the same mine a few years earlier as a
result of a similar scenario. 2 09 Notably, for the purposes of this Article, the
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Commission's discussion focused on why an electrocution accident was
reasonably likely to occur, not why a reasonably serious injury was reasonably
likely to occur assuming that an electrical accident happened. In addition to
emphasizing the fact that similar circumstances had fairly recently resulted in a
fatality, the Commission credited several contentions made by the MSHA
inspector, including that there were multiple plugs that were the same size as
the shuttle car plug and that it would not be unusual for two shuttle cars on the
same section to be down for repairs at the same time.210 In contrast, it found
unpersuasive the testimony of U.S. Steel's safety engineer that it was "a simple
process of elimination" to determine the identity of the cables. 2 11 Agreeing with
the inspector, the Commission concluded that "[t]his argument ignores the
reality, demonstrated by the accident in 1979, that miners in a hurry may easily
2 12
fail to verify which cable is which unless all cables are 'plainly marked."'
Note that the above arguments all relate to the issue of whether the identified
hazard contributed to was reasonably likely to culminate in the injuryproducing event that was determined to have been contributed to by the
violation in the second Mathies requirement.
The second citation at issue in U.S. Steel II was based upon the
inspector's observation of an unsecured oxygen cylinder and an unsecured
acetylene cylinder leaning against the rib in a shuttle car roadway.2 13 As with
the first violation, the ALJ found this citation to be significant and
substantial.2 14 In so finding, the judge noted that the section was preparing to
begin a new shift and thus that mobile equipment would be traveling past the
cited cylinders in the near future. 2 15 While the AL's opinion only discussed
this second citation briefly, the Commission found that the record supported the
AL's conclusion.2 16 While the operator argued that the shuttle cars were not
running at the time of the inspection and that the cylinders were in plastic bags
awaiting shipment off of the section, the Commission noted that the section
foreman had testified that he could not say with certainty when the cylinders
would have in fact been transported.217 In its further discussion of why the
evidence was insufficient to disturb the AL's conclusion that the violation was
significant and substantial, the Commission acknowledged that "[d]riving
habits and mining conditions are too variable," noting as relevant the fact there
was only five feet of clearance beyond the width of the shuttle car in the area
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the cylinders were located.2 18 It went on to conclude "that substantial evidence
of record supports the judge's holding that an incident involving the unsecured,
compressed gas cylinders was reasonably likely to occur." 2 19
The Commission's opinion in U.S. Steel II makes quite clear that the
third element of the Mathies significant and substantial test inquired into
whether the contemplated injury-producing event is reasonably likely to occur
based on the existing circumstances, in the context of continued normal mining
operations. Although this assessment is supported by a review of the particular
factors discussed in U.S. Steel II and the Commission's other decisions in
which the National Gypsum and Mathies formulations are applied, it is made
undeniably clear by the Commission's proclamation above that the Secretary is
required to prove that an injury-producing event is reasonably likely to occur.
E.

Texasgulf, Inc.

Another important and frequently cited decision on significant and
substantial is Texasgulf Inc.22 0 Texasgulf involved a dispute regarding whether
three similar permissibility violations were significant and substantial and is
frequently cited for the proposition that for a violation to be significant and
substantial, there must exist a "confluence of factors" which establish that the
hazard in question is reasonably likely to culminate in an event in which there
would be injury.22 1 In concluding that the alleged violations were not
significant and substantial, the ALJ reasoned that "there was no reasonable
likelihood that all of the various catalysts needed to produce an ignition or
explosion would coincide."222 The Secretary challenged both the judge's
conclusion and reasoning, arguing that the judge had "erroneously concluded
that a violation must constitute an imminent danger in order to be designated
significant and substantial."2 23
The three violations at issue in Texasgulf were all written under the
same mandatory safety standard setting forth permissibility requirements for
electric face equipment.22 4 The inspector, on three separate continuous mining
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machines, identified gaps in flange joints for various components in excess of
the maximum permissible clearance for such joints. 2 5 In his testimony
regarding why he designated the three violations significant and substantial, the
inspector argued that methane could get into the cited components through the
impermissible gaps and that arcing or sparking could then ignite the methane
and set off larger explosions of methane in the atmosphere.226 The record
evidence established that there was no methane present at the time of the
violations and that none of the machines were malfunctioning or sparking when
they were observed by the inspector.22 7
While recognizing that permissibility violations have the potential to
create serious danger, the Commission agreed with and upheld the Judge's
determination that the three violations at issue were not significant and
substantial.228 In so doing, the Commission essentially conducted a de novo
significant and substantial analysis according to the principles set forth in
National Gypsum, Mathies, and U.S. Steel I and II.229 The first step in its

analysis was the identification of the discrete safety hazard contributed to by
the alleged violations; consistent with the inspector's concerns, the
Commission determined that the relevant hazard was "that methane will enter
the subject enclosures ... through the impermissibly wide gaps in the flange
joints, be ignited by arcing or sparking of electrical components and trigger a
larger methane ignition or explosion." 230 Notably, the Commission stated that
"[t]he key question here is whether there was a reasonable likelihood that this
hazard would result in an ignition or an explosion." 231 With the violation
established and the discrete safety hazard identified, the Commission proceeded
to consider step three in the Mathies test, whether an injury was reasonably
likely to occur.
The discussion in Texasgulf regarding whether an injury was
reasonably likely to occur centered on the question of whether the conditions
that were present, and which could be expected under continued normal mining
operations, made the occurrence of an explosion reasonably likely.232 In finding
that such an explosion was not reasonably likely to occur, the Commission
noted that there had never before been a methane ignition or explosion at the

18.31(a)(6) (1986), which provided that the maximum permissible clearance for the flange joints
in permissible face equipment is 0.004 inches.
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mine and indeed that in the preceding eight years methane had never been
detected in an ignitable concentration.23 3 It also identified as being relevant the
facts that the geological characteristics of the particular mine at issue supported
the operator's contention that a methane accumulation in the ignitable range
was unlikely and that these characteristics were not conducive to methane
liberation.23 4 While the Secretary argued at the hearing that "sudden liberations
of methane cannot be ruled out," the Commission dismissed that contention,
stating that "the appropriate question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
of such a sudden liberation of methane."235 Consequently, it concluded that
"substantial evidence supports the judge's holding that for each violation at
issue there was not a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to would
result in a mine ignition or explosion." 2 36
There are critical observations to be made about the Commission's
analysis and language in Texasgulf First, the Commission's analysis clearly
focuses on whether the injury producing event contemplated is reasonably
likely to occur, not whether the hazard of a methane ignition is reasonably
likely to result in an injury, as is suggested under the analysis of PBS Coals and
Cumberland.If the analysis was consistent with Cumberland,the violations in
Texasgulf would undeniably have been significant and substantial. The
Commission agreed that the violation did contribute to the hazard of a methane
ignition and that the second Mathies element was satisfied.237 The identified
hazard contributed to being a methane explosion, it can hardly be argued that
such an event would not be reasonably likely to result in reasonably serious
injuries. Moreover, setting aside its direct reference to U.S. Steel II, the
language used by the Commission in Texasgulf simply does not support the
Cumberland interpretation of the significant and substantial analysis. In
addition to the Commission's construction of the relevant hazard, the
incompatibility of Texasgulf with Cumberland is further exemplified through
the Commission's language choices such as: "[t]he key question here is
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that this hazard would result in an
ignition or an explosion"; "[regarding significant and substantial,] the
appropriate question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of such a
sudden liberation of methane"; and of course, its conclusion that the violations
were not significant and substantial because "there was not a reasonable

233
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likelihood that the hazard contributed to would result in a mine ignition or
explosion."2 38
Having discussed these cases that shaped what significant and
substantial means, it should be clear that if the Commission is saying in PBS
Coal and Cumberland that the relevant question under the third Mathies
element is whether the hazard, if it occurred, would be reasonably likely to
result in an injury, this would represent a significant departure from precedent.
It remained largely unnoticed between PBS Coals and Cumberland,which may
have been due to the transient way in which it was presented in PBS Coals.
However, with the Commission's language in Cumberland, the Secretary
appears to believe it has found Excalibur; indeed, MSHA and the Secretary
have already begun relying on PBS Coals and Cumberland to justify the
issuance of, and refusal to modify, significant and substantial violations across
a broad range of safety and health standards. Consequently, by framing its
discussion in Cumberland as a "clarification" of the existing significant and
substantial analysis rather than a method for analyzing significant and
substantial for the "evacuation standards" it emphasized, the Commission has
sown confusion and uncertainty. The next section of this Article will further
discuss the potential impact of PBS Coals and Cumberland, why these cases
are inconsistent with the precedent discussed above, and why the Commission
may have chosen the language it did.
VI. THE ANALYSIS

IN

PBS COALS AND CUMBERLAND SHOULD BE REVISITED
AND CLARIFIED

For all the discussion in Cumberland about evacuation standards, the
discussion in PBS Coals and Cumberland does not appear to be restricted to
situations involving alleged violations of this sub-class of mandatory safety
standards. Rather, the Commission's framing of the issue as a "clarification" of
the existing significant and substantial analysis under Mathies suggests that the
analysis represents proper analytical framework for determining whether an
alleged violation of any mandatory safety or health standard is significant and
substantial.
It is interesting to note some of the language used by the Commission
in Cumberland. When addressing Cumberland's arguments that to adopt the
Secretary's position would be contrary to Mathies, the Commission explains
that it is not changing Mathies. The verbiage it used in doing so is curious:
"This method of analysis-focusing on the clear identification of the 'discrete
One could
safety hazard' in the second element of the Mathies test . ...
analysis"
of
"this
method
argue that the Commission's use of the phrase
implies that the method being discussed is in some way new or different. While
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the third Mathies element has long been the central point of contention in
litigation regarding significant and substantial before the Commission, if the
analysis were changed consistently with the decision in Cumberland, the
second element, whether the alleged violation contributes to a discrete safety
hazard, would likely become much more important.
If PBS Coals and Cumberlandhave changed Mathies from the analysis
explored in Part V of this Article, it would serve to effectively eliminate the
Secretary's burden in establishing the third Mathies element-that the hazard
contributed to is reasonably likely to result in an injury. Central to this point is
the fact that nearly every violation can be said to contribute to some kind of
discrete safety hazard. The fact that a mandatory safety or health standard has
been promulgated on a subject should be indicative of whether the violation of
that standard contributes to some type of hazard. It is remarkable that both the
IBMA and the Commission explicitly reached this conclusion. The IBMA
recognized it in Zeigler Coal Co. when it acknowledged that "by definition, the
violation of any mandatory standard could significantly and substantially
contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard,"2 40 while
the Commission stated the same in National Gypsum when it opined that "the
violation of a standard presupposes the possibility, however remote, of
contribution to an injury or illness." 2 4 ' This simple recognition is likely why the
Commission established the third Mathies requirement in the first place. It is
the third element that serves to establish the probability criterion of the test.
It is difficult to imagine many violations aside from those relating to
recordkeeping (and even many of those) where the hazard contributed to, if it
occurred, would not be reasonably likely to result in an injury. This fact is what
makes PBS Coals and Cumberland so clearly inconsistent with the last forty
years of precedent regarding significant and substantial and the Mathies test.
Take the example of a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.202(a), which provides in
pertinent part that "[t]he roof, face and ribs of areas where persons work or
travel shall be supported or otherwise controlled to protect persons from
hazards related to [the same]." 242 Under PBS Coals and Cumberland, for any
alleged violation of § 75.202(a), the finding of the violation is going to be
synonymous with a finding of significant and substantial. The standard would
not be violated if the conditions were not such that a roof, face, or rib hazard
was contributed to. What is the discrete safety hazard then? The hazard would
have to be "the danger of a miner being struck by roof material or a rib
outburst." From PBS Coals and Cumberland,we know that it is inappropriate
to conflate the terms "violation" and "hazard"; so under that analysis, the next
question would be whether that hazard, "a miner being struck by roof material
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or a rib outburst," is reasonably likely to result in an injury. This is an easy
answer. It is practically beyond argument that such an event would cause
injury. Of course, this effect is not limited to Section 75.202(a). An entire
swath of mandatory safety and health standards will now be almost
presumptively significant and substantial. Under the PBS Coals and
Cumberland formulation, many violations, which before would have been
almost certainly non-significant and substantial, will now be undeniably
significant and substantial.
Consider, for example, the unsecured oxygen and acetylene tanks from
Mathies. But instead of the tanks being present in a frequently traveled
roadway with limited clearance for mobile equipment, imagine that the tanks
are in a remote area where no persons or equipment travel. No one except for
the maintenance person who placed the tanks there will ever be in the area.
Under the pre-PBS Coals-Mathies test, there is a very high likelihood that most
judges, and indeed the Commission, would determine that such a violation is
non-significant and substantial because under these particular circumstances, an
injury is not reasonably likely to occur. Is there a violation? Of course, because
30 C.F.R. § 75.1106-3 requires any such tanks to be secured to prevent tipping
over. 24 3 Does the violation contribute to a discrete safety hazard? It does;
because the tanks are standing and not secured, there is now a possibility that
they could either fall over on someone or get damaged and become projectiles.
Now the third Mathies element: Is the hazard contributed to reasonably likely
to result in an injury? Under Mathies, we would say probably not. There is very
minimal exposure. The only person who would be in the area already knows
that the tanks are there and are unsecured. The likelihood of an injury is
negligible. But under the Cumberland style analysis, the answer is quite the
opposite. What is the hazard? "The danger of the unsecured tanks falling onto a
miner or striking a miner as projectiles." Be careful not to conflate the terms
"violation" and "hazard." Is that hazard reasonably likely to result in an injury?
The tanks are heavy; if one fell on a miner, it is reasonably likely to break his
foot. Certainly, if a cylinder was launched and struck a miner as a projectile,
injury is a near certainty. As for the fourth element, the broken bones and
lacerations which could be expected from such an incident will always be
considered to be reasonably serious.
The Commission explained in PBS Coals and Cumberland that the
respondent in each case had conflated the terms "violation" and "hazard." 244
Although the words "violation" and "hazard" are indeed different, those terms

243
30 C.F.R. § 75.1106-3 (2012) (providing that: "(a) Liquefied and nonliquefied compressed
gas cylinders stored in an underground coal mine shall be: . . . (2) Placed securely in storage
areas designated by the operator for such purpose, and . . . in an upright position, preferably in
specially designated racks, or otherwise secured against being accidently tipped over").
244
See Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2366; Musser Eng'g, Inc. & PBS
Coal,
Inc., 32 FMSHRC 1257, 1280-81 (2010).
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have been used interchangeably in the context of the significant and substantial
analysis under Mathies and National Gypsum, as should be evident from the
discussion of the cases above. Yet, in its analysis in Cumberland,it appears that
the Commission may have confused one of the elements of the Mathies test. As
discussed above, the second element of the Mathies test is whether the alleged
conditions contribute to a discrete safety hazard.245 In rejecting Cumberland's
arguments that the Commission's new approach would result in nearly all
violations of evacuation standards being significant and substantial, the
Commission stated that "if the violations [in this case] had instead been
relatively minor in nature and scope, a fact-finder may well not have found that
the violations contributed to the hazard of miners being delayed in escaping
from the mine in an emergency under element two of Mathies."246
While not three pages earlier in its opinion in Cumberland the
Commission suggested that the respondent had imposed an additional burden
on the Secretary not present in Mathies, the Commission itself imposed an
additional burden with the preceding statement regarding the second Mathies
element. In Cumberland, the Commission seems to have replaced the
requirement of "contributing to a discrete safety hazard" with "significantly
contributing to a discrete safety hazard." 2 47 The latter, of course, is not a
requirement under Mathies. Closer evaluation of the Commission's quoted
statement above in the context of the alleged violations and particular
regulatory standard cited in Cumberland quickly reveals this inconsistency.
The mandatory mine safety standard cited in the four violations at issue
in Cumberlandrequires lifelines to be "[1]ocated in such a manner for miners to
use effectively to escape."248 Accordingly, for there to be a violation, it is
axiomatic that the lifeline must be located such that miners would not be able to
use it effectively to escape. It is therefore not possible to have a violation of
that standard which would not contribute in some increment to the hazard of
"miners being delayed in the event of an emergency." Consequently, there can
be no situation where Section 75.380(d)(7)(iv) is violated, but the conditions do
not contribute to the discrete safety hazard identified earlier in this paragraph.
Although that particular safety standard happens to be the one that was at issue
in Cumberland,similar results will follow with respect to most standards in the
way demonstrated through the examples above.
Also worthy of discussion is the fact that in the Commission's desire to
justify its agreement with the Secretary that an emergency situation should be
assumed when considering whether evacuation standards are significant and
substantial, the Commission argued that to adopt the construction urged by
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Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1, 4 (1984).
CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2368.
See id
30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7)(iv) (2012).
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Cumberland would lead to what it characterized as the absurd result that
violations of evacuation standards would rarely be significant and substantial,
and would thus defeat the purpose of the standard. 24 9 This contention inherently
takes the position that if a standard is unlikely to be designated significant and
substantial, then it is somehow not fulfilling its purpose. It ignores several
important characteristics of the Mine Act's enforcement scheme. First, once an
inspector identifies a violation of an evacuation standard, or any standard,
significant and substantial or not, the operator must correct the cited conditions
within the abatement time set by the issuing inspector. If the operator does not
abate the violation by correcting the identified condition within the prescribed
time, the operator is subject to a section 104(b) withdrawal order for its failure
to do so.25 Moreover, if a section 104(d)(1) predicate unwarrantable failure
citation is in place, an inspector has the ability to issue unwarrantable failure
withdrawal orders for non-significant and substantial violations if he believes
that the operator is not taking its obligations regarding the evacuation standards
seriously. 1 In the same vein, if an operator were not putting forth a good faith
effort towards compliance, MSHA has the ability to levy significant penalties
beyond the standard formulation under 30 C.F.R. § 100.5.252 These special
assessment powers provide MSHA with all the flexibility it needs to provide
meaningful consequences for violations of evacuation standards.
Although it is unclear in exactly what way the Commission believed
the standard would be rendered ineffective, its discussion of the issue implies
that the significant and substantial designation is the only meaningful tool in
MSHA's arsenal, which simply is not true. The only way this situation would
affect the impact of violations of such evacuation standards is in their effect on
the pattern of violations analysis, which is based on the incidence rates of
significant and substantial violations, among other things. Even so, the pattern
of violations screening takes other safety and compliance parameters into
account that would be affected by severe non-significant and substantial
violations of evacuation standards, such as the issuance of section 104(b)
withdrawal orders and section 104(d) unwarrantable failure citations and
orders.
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CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2366-67.
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, § 104(b), 91
Stat. 1290,

1300.
See id. § 104(d).
252 Determination ofPenalty Amount; Special Assessment, 30 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2013) provides
as follows:
(a) MSHA may elect to waive the regular assessment under § 100.3 if it
determines that conditions warrant a special assessment. (b) When MSHA
determines that a special assessment is appropriate, the proposed penalty will
be based on the six criteria set forth in § 100.3(a). All findings shall be in
narrative form.
30 C.F.R. § 100.5.
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In Cumberland,the Commission placed a great deal of emphasis on the
fact that the violations at issue were "evacuation standards." 25 3 It devoted
several paragraphs to discussing the legislative and regulatory history of these
standards, explaining that "[e]vacuation standards are different from other mine
safety standards" and are "intended to apply meaningfully only when an
emergency actually occurs." 254 Yet, for all of its emphasis and discussion
regarding the MINER Act and evacuation standards, the discussion in
Cumberland regarding significant and substantial related to the analytical
framework itself. While the potential implications of PBS Coals and
Cumberland raise major concerns, it is possible to make an argument that
evacuation standards should be given some kind of special consideration.
VII. THE "EVACUATION STANDARDS" OF CUMBERLAND COAL RESOURCESMAYBE THEY SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY

It is not necessarily an unreasonable position to argue that for alleged
violations of "evacuation standards," the third element of the Mathies
significant and substantial test should be evaluated in the context of an
emergency. This is not the problem with Cumberland. As the Commission
forcefully explains in Cumberland, "[e]vacuation standards are different than
other mine safety standards."2 55 Moreover, the fact that these obligations only
came into existence after the passage of the 2006 MINER Act, a piece of
legislation specifically enacted to increase miner safety in emergency
situations, lends support to the idea that it may be appropriate to treat these
obligations different in some way than other safety and health standards.
The Commission's holding in Cumberlandmade some very reasonable
and persuasive points in this regard. However, it is inaccurate to state that these
standards are "intended to apply meaningfully only when an emergency
actually occurs."2 56 The existence of these standards creates an obligation for
compliance at all times. Failure to achieve rapid compliance when cited by
MSHA, or repeated failures to maintain compliance, can subject an operator to
withdrawal orders and significant civil penalties at MSHA's discretion. Thus,
these standards apply meaningfully at all times. On the other hand, it is
certainly correct to say that evacuation standards only provide observable
benefit to miners in the event of an emergency. The Commission's statement is
akin to arguing that car insurance only protects you when you have an accident.
The policy protects you as long as it is in effect; however, it only pays out
when there is an accident.

253 See discussion supraPart III.B.
254
See CumberlandCoal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC at 2367.
255

Id. (emphasis added).
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Nonetheless, the two cases the Commission majority cited to support
its position that it "never required the establishment of the reasonable
likelihood of [an emergency] when considering whether violations of
evacuation standards are [significant and substantial]," while not making the
same kind of broad-based proclamation as PBS Coals or Cumberland,do give
some support to this approach for evacuation standards.257 However, review of
these cases, Maple Creek Mining, Inc.2 5 8 and Rushton Mining Co.,259 reveal that
they do not stand for this proposition as clearly as the Commission suggests.
Maple Creek Mining, Inc. involved a fairly unique set of
circumstances. 2 60 The Maple Creek Mine had such a significant water
percolation and seepage problem that the operator was pumping out between
1.2 and 2 million gallons of water per day to maintain production.2 61 It was
established that there existed in the cited escapeways a water accumulation of
such a magnitude that miners would have to walk a narrow passageway along
the right rib to avoid the six to seventeen inch mud and muck accumulation that
existed in the remainder of the escapeway. 2 62 The judge concluded that the
conditions created a hazard that would prevent miners, including those that
might be carrying a stretcher, from swiftly negotiating the escapeway.26 3
Notably, the very shift before the subject order was issued, a miner had slipped
and been injured while walking the narrow path; this was not in any sort of
emergency situation.264 One very significant observation made by the
Commission, which indeed makes the Commission's reference in Cumberland
to Maple Creek of questionable import, is that "the []udge found, and Maple
Creek does not dispute, that the mine had been experiencing methane and
ventilation problems when the withdrawal order issued." 2 6 5 Thus, it is quite
possible that the Commission based its determination of reasonable likelihood
on a combination of the pervasive nature of the conditions and the presence of
circumstances which made the use of the escapeway reasonably likely. If
nothing else, the reference to those circumstances suggests that the
Commission felt it needed to make findings regarding whether an emergency
situation was likely to occur. It is also interesting to note that the Maple Creek
language referenced by the Commission in Cumberland was in relation to the
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Maple Creek Mining, Inc., 27 FMSHRC 555 (2005).
Rushton Mining Co., 11 FMSHRC 1432 (1989).
Maple Creek Mining, Inc., 27 FMSHRC at 556-57.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 560.
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analysis of the fourth Mathies requirement regarding the severity of the injury,
not whether an injury was reasonably likely to occur.266
Rushton Mining Co. involved a situation in which the operator had
designated an escapeway route which MSHA alleged was not "the safest direct
practical route to the nearest mine opening suitable for the safe evacuation of
miners," within the meaning of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1704-2(a).2 67 The judge agreed,
finding that "the escapeway designated in order to abate the violation was
[more] direct and less than one third the distance of the [operator's] cited
escapeway."26 8 He also determined that the violation was not significant and
substantial because the inspector had not been able to provide persuasive
testimony regarding the hazardous nature of being forced to use the operator's
escapeway. 2 69 The sole issue on appeal to the Commission was whether the
judge erred in determining that the violation was not significant and
substantial.270
The Secretary argued, much like she did in Cumberland, that "the
seriousness of Rushton's violation of the escapeway standard must be evaluated
within the context of the occurrence of an emergency and in comparison to the
escapeway subsequently designated." 27 ' The Commission began by briefly
summarizing its case law regarding significant and substantial.272 However, not
only did the Commission not directly address the Secretary's very specific
assertion that the significant and substantial analysis should be conducted
assuming an emergency, but it also proceeded to find that the Secretary had
failed to establish that the violation contributed to a discrete safety hazard as
required to fulfill the second Mathies requirement.273 It explained that "the
Secretary has failed to show that the distance, travel time, or any inherent
qualities of the cited route posed a discrete safety hazard."274 Accordingly,
while the Commission did go on to very briefly discuss the third and fourth
Mathies elements together at the same time, the remainder of the opinion is
dicta. Even so, the language employed does actually suggest that the
Commission may have looked upon the Secretary's position regarding the
assumption of an emergency favorably. In its brief discussion regarding the

Id. at 564 n.5. "The potential for slips and falls would therefore be even greater during a
mine evacuation. Consequently, the miners' everyday travel over the escapeway route is of little
relevance to the fourth Mathies element." Id.
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Rushton Mining Co., 11 FMSHRC 1432, 1433 (1989).
268
Id. at 1434.
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third and fourth Mathies elements, the Commission did state that the Secretary
failed to show that the new route posed a reasonable likelihood of injury "in the
event of an evacuation."275
Despite the above discussion of how these two cases do not completely
support the Secretary's position, the language used by the Commission therein
does leave open the issue of whether an emergency situation could be assumed.
The movement to an assumption of an emergency situation for
violations of evacuation standards has potential to create some significant
problems for mine operators. Mines, particularly underground coal, are
dynamic environments, where conditions can change very quickly. Many of the
areas that are subject to these evacuation standards are only required to be
examined on a weekly basis. When inspecting these areas, MSHA's inspectors
frequently accompany the examiner during his weekly examination. At that
point, the examiner is traveling the area specifically to look for potential
hazards in an area that has not been traveled for a week. Citations are
frequently issued. As discussed above, significant and substantial violations
play a central role in the application of MSHA's pattern of violations
authority. 276 Under the Cumberland framework, nearly all violations of
evacuation standards are going to be issued, and are likely to remain,
designated as significant and substantial. What this means is that more
operators are going to fulfill the pattern of violations screening criteria because
of significant and substantial violations of evacuation standards.
Although there is thus some indirect support in forty years of precedent
for the argument that one should assume the existence of an emergency when
considering whether a violation of an evacuation standard is significant and
substantial, it is crucial to note again that this is not what the Commission held
in PBS Coals and Cumberland. These cases suggest that the third Mathies
element should be considered assuming that the hazard has occurred, and were
not limited to evacuation standards.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Significant and substantial is a multi-faceted legal construct with a long
and varied history. All the same, it remains a central part of the Mine Act's
graduated enforcement scheme and an issue of major consequence to mine
operators and practitioners in this area of the law. Although the scope of
significant and substantial has stayed largely constant since the Commission's
decisions in National Gypsum and Mathies, the Commission's recent decisions
in PBS Coals and Cumberland raise questions regarding how the analysis will
be conducted going forward.
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The test under the third Mathies requirement has long been interpreted
to inquire as to whether an injury-producing event was reasonably likely to
occur under continued normal mining operations. The Commission has
explicitly stated that the test set forth in Mathies is still in force and that the
Commission has not changed it. At the same time, the Commission has also
"clarified" the distinction between the terms "hazard" and "violation,"
cautioning us not to confuse the two with respect to the third Mathies element.
This distinction suggests that rather than looking forward from the time of the
violation, the question has essentially been changed to ask whether an injury is
reasonably likely to occur if the hazardous event identified in element two
occurred. Indeed, that appears to be the analysis that was conducted in the
Commission's recent decision in Black Beauty, which did not relate to an
evacuation standard. This change represents a significant and largely
unsupported departure from past jurisprudence.
Although the Commission placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact
that the violations at issue in Cumberlandrelated to "evacuation standards," its
discussion regarding the third Mathies requirement was not so limited. Rather,
the language in Cumberland, consistent with that in PBS Coals, suggests
general applicability. This is not to say that it would be unwarranted to apply a
different analytical approach when determining whether violations of
evacuation standards are significant and substantial. These standards are indeed
different from other safety and health standards. Whether it might be
appropriate to treat violations of evacuation standards differently from other
violations, and exactly how to do so, are issues that could be discussed further.
Either the significant and substantial analysis under Mathies remains
unchanged, or the distinction between the words violation and hazard has
gained additional significance with regard to the third element. It is one or the
other. If it turns out that the Commission has, in fact, changed the analysis in
the way that PBS Coals and Cumberland suggest, it would effectively create a
presumption of significant and substantial, a la Alabama By-Products. This
would, in turn, result in increased civil penalties and more operators contending
with the specter of the pattern of violations.

